Case: John Higgins
Case: John Higgins
Leonard Prescott, vice president and general manager of Weaver-Yamazaki Pharmaceutical of Japan, believed that his executive assistant, John Higgins, was losing his effectiveness in representing the U.S. parent company because of his extraordinary identification with the Japanese culture.
Weaver Pharmaceutical, with extensive international operations, was one of the largest U.S. drug firms. Its competitive position depended
heavily on ^par^hjvnrl development (RfrT)).
Sales activity in Japan had begun in the early 1930s through distributorship by Yamazaki Pharmaceutical, a major producer of drugs and chemicals in Japan. World War II disrupted sales, but Weaver resumed export sales to Japan in 1948 and captured a substantial market share. To prepare for increasingly keen competition
from Japanese producers in the foreseeable future, Weaver decided to undertake local production of some of its product lines. In 1953 the company began preliminary negotiations with Yamazaki, which culminated in the establishment of a jointly owned and operated manufacturing subsidiary in 1954. (Japan is shown in Map 3.2.)
Through the combined effort of both parents, the subsidiary soon began to manufacture sufficiently broad lines of products to fill the general demands of the Japanese market. Importation from the United States was limited to highly specialized items. The company conducted substantial research and development on its own, coordinated through a joint committee of both parents to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts. The subsidiary had turned out many new products, some of which were marketed successfully in the United States and elsewhere. Weaver management considered the Japanese operation to be one of the most successful of its international ventures. It felt that the company's future
prospects were promising, especially since steady improvement was occurring in Japan's standard of living.
The subsidiary was headed by Shozo Suzuki, who as executive vice president of Yamazaki and also president of several other subsidiaries limited his participation in Weaver-Yamazaki to determination of basic policies. Daily operations were managed by Prescott, assisted by Higgins and several Japanese directors. Though several other Americans were assigned to the venture, they were concerned with R&D and held no overall management responsibilities.
The Weaver Company had a policy of moving
United States personnel from one foreign post to another with occasional tours in the international division of the home office. Each assign-ment generally lasted for three to five years. Since there was a limited number of expatriates, the personnel policy was flexible enough to allow an employee to stay in a country for an indefinite period of time if he or she desired. A few expatriates had stayed in one foreign post for over ten years.
Prescott replaced the former general manager, who had been in Japan for six years. Prescott was experienced at international work, having spent most of his 2 5-year career with the company in jobs with international responsibilities. He had served in India, the Philippines, and Mexico and had spent several years in the home-office international division. He was delighted to be challenged to expand the Japanese operations. After two years there, Prescott was pleased with the progress the company had made and felt a sense of accomplishment in developing a smoothly functioning organization.
He became concerned, however, with the notable changes in Higgins's attitude and thinking. Prescott felt that Higgins had absorbed and internalized the Japanese culture to such a degree that he had lost the U.S. point of view. He had "gone native," resulting in a substantial loss of his administrative effectiveness.
Higgins was born in a small Midwestern town; after high school he entered his state university. Midway through college he joined the army. Because he had shown an interest in languages in college, he was given an opportunity to attend the Army Language School for intensive training in Japanese. After fifteen months he was assigned as an interpreter and translator in Tokyo. While in Japan, he took further courses in Japanese language, literature, and history. He made many Japanese friends, fell in love with Japan, and vowed to return there. After five years in the army, Higgins returned to college. Because he wanted to use the language as a means rather than an end in itself, he finished his college work in management rather than in
Japanese. He graduated with honors a year and a half later and joined Weaver. After a year in the company training program he was assigned to Japan, a year before Prescott's arrival.
Higgins was pleased to return to Japan, not only because of his love for Japan, but also for the opportunity to improve the "ugly American" image abroad. Because of his language ability and interest in Japan, he was able to intermingle with broad segments of the Japanese population. He noted that U.S. managers had a tendency to impose their value systems, ideals, and thinking patterns upon the Japanese, believing that anything from the United States was universally right and applicable. He felt indignant about these attitudes on numerous occasions and was determined to remedy them.
Under both Prescott and his predecessor, Higgins's responsibilities included troubleshooting with major Japanese customers, attending trade meetings, negotiating with gmaxupgnt officials, conducting marketing research projects, and helping with day-to-day administration. Both managers sought his advice on manyclifficult jind complex administrativej)rx>i>lems and found hlmcapalSter-——~
Prescott mentally listed a few examples to describe what he meant by Higgins's "complete emotional involvement" with Japanese culture. The year before, Higgins had married a Japanese-woman who had studied in the United States and graduated from a prestigious Japanese university. At that time, Higgins had asked for and received permission to extend his stay in Japan for an indefinite period. This seemed to Prescott to make a turning point in Higgins's behavior.
Higgins moved to a strictly Japanese neighborhood, relaxed in a kimono at home, used the public bath, and was invited to weddings, neighborhood parties, and even Buddhist funerals. Although Weaver had a policy of grantingjtwo jnonths' home leave every two years with paid transportation tor the employee and his family, Higgins declined his trips, preferring to visit remote parts of Japan with his wife.
At work, Higgins had also taken on many
characteristics of a typical Japanese executive. He spent a great deal of time listening to the personal problems of his subordinates, maintained close social ties with many of the men in the organization, and had even arranged marriages for some of the young employees.Consequently, many employees sought Higgins's attention to register their complaints and demands with management. These included requests for more liberal fringe benefits in the form of recreational activities and acquisition of rest houses at resort areas. Many employees also complained to Hig-gins about a new personnel policy, installed by Prescott, that involved a move away from promotion based on seniority to one based on superiors' evaluations of subordinates. The employees asked Higgins to intercede on their behalf. He did so and insisted that their demands were justified.
Although Prescott believed it was helpful to learn the feelings of middle managers from Higgins, he disliked having to deal with Higgins as an adversary rather than as an ally. Prescott became hesitant to ask Higgins's opinion because Higgins invariably raised objections to changes that were contrary to the Japanese norm. Prescott believed that there were dynamic changes taking place in traditional Japanese customs and culture, and he was confident that many of Higgins's objections were not tied to existing cultural patterns as rigidly as Higgins seemed to think. This opinion was bolstered by the fact that many of the Japanese subordinates were more willing to try out new ideas than Higgins was. . Prescott further thought that there was no point in a progressive U.S. company's merely copying the local customs.Jie felt that the company's real contribution to Japanese society was in introducing new ideas and innovations.
Recent incidents had raised some doubts in Prescott's mind as to the soundness of Higgins's judgment, something Prescott had never questioned before. For example, there was a case involving the dismissal of a manager who in Prescott's opinion lacked initiative, leadership, and general competency. After two years of continued prodding by his superiors, including Prescott himself, the manager still showed little interest in self-improvement. Both Higgins and the personnel manager objected vigorously to the dismissal because the company had never done this before. They also argued that the man involved was loyal and honest and that the company was partially at fault for having kept him on for the last ten years without spotting the incompetency. A few weeks after the dismissal, Prescott learned accidentally that Higgins had hv , terceded on behalf of the fired employee, resulting in Yamazaki Pharmaceutical's taking him on. When confronted, Higgins simply said that he had done what was expected of a superior in any Japanese company.
Prescott Jaelieved these incidents suggested a serious problem. Higgins had been an effective and efficient manager whose knowledge of the language and the people had proved invaluable. On numerous occasions, his friends in U.S. firms said they envied Prescott for having a man of Higgins's qualifications as an assistant. Prescott also knew that Higgins had received several outstanding offers to go with other companies in Japan. Prescott felt that Higgins would be far more effective if he could take a more emotionally detached attitude toward Japan. In Prescott's vievv^ the best international executive was one who retained a belief in the fundamentals of the home [U.S.] point of view while also understanding foreign attitudes. This understanding, of course, should be thorough or even instinctive, but it also should be objective, characterized neither by disdain nor by strong emotional attachment.
3. If you were the Weaver corporate management person responsible for the Japanese operations and the conflict between Higgins and Prescott had come to your attention, what would you do? Be sure first to identify some alternatives and then to make your recommendations.
Leonard Prescott, vice president and general manager of Weaver-Yamazaki Pharmaceutical of Japan, believed that his executive assistant, John Higgins, was losing his effectiveness in representing the U.S. parent company because of his extraordinary identification with the Japanese culture.
Weaver Pharmaceutical, with extensive international operations, was one of the largest U.S. drug firms. Its competitive position depended
heavily on ^par^hjvnrl development (RfrT)).
Sales activity in Japan had begun in the early 1930s through distributorship by Yamazaki Pharmaceutical, a major producer of drugs and chemicals in Japan. World War II disrupted sales, but Weaver resumed export sales to Japan in 1948 and captured a substantial market share. To prepare for increasingly keen competition
from Japanese producers in the foreseeable future, Weaver decided to undertake local production of some of its product lines. In 1953 the company began preliminary negotiations with Yamazaki, which culminated in the establishment of a jointly owned and operated manufacturing subsidiary in 1954. (Japan is shown in Map 3.2.)
Through the combined effort of both parents, the subsidiary soon began to manufacture sufficiently broad lines of products to fill the general demands of the Japanese market. Importation from the United States was limited to highly specialized items. The company conducted substantial research and development on its own, coordinated through a joint committee of both parents to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts. The subsidiary had turned out many new products, some of which were marketed successfully in the United States and elsewhere. Weaver management considered the Japanese operation to be one of the most successful of its international ventures. It felt that the company's future
prospects were promising, especially since steady improvement was occurring in Japan's standard of living.
The subsidiary was headed by Shozo Suzuki, who as executive vice president of Yamazaki and also president of several other subsidiaries limited his participation in Weaver-Yamazaki to determination of basic policies. Daily operations were managed by Prescott, assisted by Higgins and several Japanese directors. Though several other Americans were assigned to the venture, they were concerned with R&D and held no overall management responsibilities.
The Weaver Company had a policy of moving
United States personnel from one foreign post to another with occasional tours in the international division of the home office. Each assign-ment generally lasted for three to five years. Since there was a limited number of expatriates, the personnel policy was flexible enough to allow an employee to stay in a country for an indefinite period of time if he or she desired. A few expatriates had stayed in one foreign post for over ten years.
Prescott replaced the former general manager, who had been in Japan for six years. Prescott was experienced at international work, having spent most of his 2 5-year career with the company in jobs with international responsibilities. He had served in India, the Philippines, and Mexico and had spent several years in the home-office international division. He was delighted to be challenged to expand the Japanese operations. After two years there, Prescott was pleased with the progress the company had made and felt a sense of accomplishment in developing a smoothly functioning organization.
He became concerned, however, with the notable changes in Higgins's attitude and thinking. Prescott felt that Higgins had absorbed and internalized the Japanese culture to such a degree that he had lost the U.S. point of view. He had "gone native," resulting in a substantial loss of his administrative effectiveness.
Higgins was born in a small Midwestern town; after high school he entered his state university. Midway through college he joined the army. Because he had shown an interest in languages in college, he was given an opportunity to attend the Army Language School for intensive training in Japanese. After fifteen months he was assigned as an interpreter and translator in Tokyo. While in Japan, he took further courses in Japanese language, literature, and history. He made many Japanese friends, fell in love with Japan, and vowed to return there. After five years in the army, Higgins returned to college. Because he wanted to use the language as a means rather than an end in itself, he finished his college work in management rather than in
Japanese. He graduated with honors a year and a half later and joined Weaver. After a year in the company training program he was assigned to Japan, a year before Prescott's arrival.
Higgins was pleased to return to Japan, not only because of his love for Japan, but also for the opportunity to improve the "ugly American" image abroad. Because of his language ability and interest in Japan, he was able to intermingle with broad segments of the Japanese population. He noted that U.S. managers had a tendency to impose their value systems, ideals, and thinking patterns upon the Japanese, believing that anything from the United States was universally right and applicable. He felt indignant about these attitudes on numerous occasions and was determined to remedy them.
Under both Prescott and his predecessor, Higgins's responsibilities included troubleshooting with major Japanese customers, attending trade meetings, negotiating with gmaxupgnt officials, conducting marketing research projects, and helping with day-to-day administration. Both managers sought his advice on manyclifficult jind complex administrativej)rx>i>lems and found hlmcapalSter-——~
Prescott mentally listed a few examples to describe what he meant by Higgins's "complete emotional involvement" with Japanese culture. The year before, Higgins had married a Japanese-woman who had studied in the United States and graduated from a prestigious Japanese university. At that time, Higgins had asked for and received permission to extend his stay in Japan for an indefinite period. This seemed to Prescott to make a turning point in Higgins's behavior.
Higgins moved to a strictly Japanese neighborhood, relaxed in a kimono at home, used the public bath, and was invited to weddings, neighborhood parties, and even Buddhist funerals. Although Weaver had a policy of grantingjtwo jnonths' home leave every two years with paid transportation tor the employee and his family, Higgins declined his trips, preferring to visit remote parts of Japan with his wife.
At work, Higgins had also taken on many
characteristics of a typical Japanese executive. He spent a great deal of time listening to the personal problems of his subordinates, maintained close social ties with many of the men in the organization, and had even arranged marriages for some of the young employees.Consequently, many employees sought Higgins's attention to register their complaints and demands with management. These included requests for more liberal fringe benefits in the form of recreational activities and acquisition of rest houses at resort areas. Many employees also complained to Hig-gins about a new personnel policy, installed by Prescott, that involved a move away from promotion based on seniority to one based on superiors' evaluations of subordinates. The employees asked Higgins to intercede on their behalf. He did so and insisted that their demands were justified.
Although Prescott believed it was helpful to learn the feelings of middle managers from Higgins, he disliked having to deal with Higgins as an adversary rather than as an ally. Prescott became hesitant to ask Higgins's opinion because Higgins invariably raised objections to changes that were contrary to the Japanese norm. Prescott believed that there were dynamic changes taking place in traditional Japanese customs and culture, and he was confident that many of Higgins's objections were not tied to existing cultural patterns as rigidly as Higgins seemed to think. This opinion was bolstered by the fact that many of the Japanese subordinates were more willing to try out new ideas than Higgins was. . Prescott further thought that there was no point in a progressive U.S. company's merely copying the local customs.Jie felt that the company's real contribution to Japanese society was in introducing new ideas and innovations.
Recent incidents had raised some doubts in Prescott's mind as to the soundness of Higgins's judgment, something Prescott had never questioned before. For example, there was a case involving the dismissal of a manager who in Prescott's opinion lacked initiative, leadership, and general competency. After two years of continued prodding by his superiors, including Prescott himself, the manager still showed little interest in self-improvement. Both Higgins and the personnel manager objected vigorously to the dismissal because the company had never done this before. They also argued that the man involved was loyal and honest and that the company was partially at fault for having kept him on for the last ten years without spotting the incompetency. A few weeks after the dismissal, Prescott learned accidentally that Higgins had hv , terceded on behalf of the fired employee, resulting in Yamazaki Pharmaceutical's taking him on. When confronted, Higgins simply said that he had done what was expected of a superior in any Japanese company.
Prescott Jaelieved these incidents suggested a serious problem. Higgins had been an effective and efficient manager whose knowledge of the language and the people had proved invaluable. On numerous occasions, his friends in U.S. firms said they envied Prescott for having a man of Higgins's qualifications as an assistant. Prescott also knew that Higgins had received several outstanding offers to go with other companies in Japan. Prescott felt that Higgins would be far more effective if he could take a more emotionally detached attitude toward Japan. In Prescott's vievv^ the best international executive was one who retained a belief in the fundamentals of the home [U.S.] point of view while also understanding foreign attitudes. This understanding, of course, should be thorough or even instinctive, but it also should be objective, characterized neither by disdain nor by strong emotional attachment.
3. If you were the Weaver corporate management person responsible for the Japanese operations and the conflict between Higgins and Prescott had come to your attention, what would you do? Be sure first to identify some alternatives and then to make your recommendations.
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